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This research provides an analysis of the current security
threat to Norway posed by increased Soviet pressures on the
northern flank of NATO and Norwegian reactions to Soviet
pressure. Nordic regional security is discussed in order to
determine the background of Norwegian NATO membership, Nordic
unity and the importance of the northern flank. As Soviet
pressures have increased in Norwegian territorial waters and
airspace, on the Svalbard archipelago, and in the Barents and
Norwegian seas, Norwegian support of NATO has been questioned,
particularly regarding political trends in Norway in the
early 1970' s and Norwegian policies concerning NATO. The
results of the research determine that Soviet pressure has
been counterproductive. Norwegian support for NATO has
increased as a result of pressure. Other Norwegian national
issues are not directly related to support for NATO, but are
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I. INTRODUCTION
'he past decade has provided numerous discussions
jrning the erosion of the NATO Alliance and the weakening
idividual member's resolve in the alliance. At the same
the term "Finlandization" has gained popularity as a
iword applied to many of the Western European nations,
forway has not escaped this latest wave of discussion.
:gian policies and politics are frequently misunderstood
ret, are used as a basis for criticism. Among those most
l voiced: 1) Norway's policies barring nuclear weapons
"oreign troops from Norwegian soil; 2) Norway's close
.c ties with non-NATO members; 3) results of the 1972
•endum in Norway, which turned down EEC membership.
!n addition to internal political decisions, external
;ure exerted on Norway by the Soviet Union has provided
)asis for assumptions that Norway must be weakening in
)Osition as a NATO member. In question is whether a
>n of 4 million people can withstand the pressures of a
lbor as strong as the Soviet Union.
.'hese arguments and misrepresentations indicated the need
i closer study of the Norwegian position. Therefore, the
""Finlandization" is a term often used to describe the
:ionship between the USSR and Finland. This term is
lently applied to other countries to denote a process of
;e in the relationships of those countries with the Soviet
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Figure 1: Map of the Nordic Region

thesis of this research is that under increased Soviet
pressures, the resolve of the Norwegian people towards
support of NATO has not been weakened, but rather strengthened.
Initially, an examination of Nordic Unity is necessary
to determine the historical background of Norway's relation-
ship with other non-NATO Nordic countries. This examination
will include the background of Norway's entrance in the NATO
alliance.
In Chapter III, the increased Soviet threat to Norwegian
security will be discussed. This will provide insight into
Norway's strategic importance by virtue of physical location,
and as the only northern NATO country bordering on the Soviet
Union.
Chapter IV will examine recent events in Soviet-Norwegian
relations and what their effect has been on the Norwegian
policies. Included in this chapter are the recent events
concerning Svalbard and the Barents Sea. These issues, still
unresolved, are crucial to any discussion of the present
attitudes toward the Soviet Union and towards support of NATO.
The Norwegian reaction to national and international
politics will be discussed in Chapter V. The Norwegian EEC
referendum in 1972, and the Norwegian national election of
1973 are often misunderstood, particularly in their relation-
ship to NATO support. These relationships will be examined
utilizing polls conducted before and after the elections.
In addition, this chapter will include the results of polls
registering support for NATO, indicating changes in public
8

opinion from initial entrance until the present day.
In Chapter VI the conclusions reached through research
will determine the validity of the thesis. The conclusions
will take into account the historic background of Nordic
unity, the relationship between the Soviet Union and Norway
and the reaction of the Norwegian government and people to
recent Soviet actions.
In order to solidify a framework for studying this
problem and to varify research completed, interviews were
conducted with Norwegian citizens in Monterey, CA,
Washington, D.C. and finally Oslo, Norway. Interviews
were conducted: 1) in Oslo, at the Ministry of Defense and
the Foreign Ministry with Norwegian government officials,
at the University of Oslo and the Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs with scholars of Nordic affairs, and
in private offices and homes with writers and scholars;
2) in Washington, at the State Department with Norwegian and
Scandinavian desk officers, at the Foreign Press Building
with the Norwegian U.S. correspondent; 3) in Monterey, with
senior Norwegian military officers at the Defense Resources
Management Center, and with Norwegian students attending the
Naval Postgraduate School. A list of interviewees is pro-
vided in the bibliography. Since these interviews were
conducted to validate rather than gather research material,
no direct quotes will be used; nor should information found
in this study be attributed to individuals interviewed.

Finally the area included in this study is not usually
covered by maps in a scale providing good detail. However,
maps and portions of maps will be provided wherever possible
to assist the reader in understanding the area.
10

II. SECURITY OF THE NORDIC REGION
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Nordic security is dependent upon international environ-
ment as is the security of most of the world. The Nordic
countries are faced with unique problems in this respect,
since they are directly linked to the two opposing super-
powers in the world environment while maintaining an extremely
close regional relationship.
In the aftermath of World War II, Europe split into two
quite distinct camps which are territorially defined and
separated by ideology. As pointed out by Egil Ulstein, "In
some ways the Nordic countries may be said to straddle the
split of Europe." The interests of these countries are
firmly tied to European interests, tied to each other and
tied directly to opposing powers and ideologies. The problems
faced by the area can be studied by examining the relation-
ships each nation maintains within the Nordic Area and in the
international environment
.
A brief historical background is necessary for a better
understanding of Nordic cooperation. The countries of
Finland and Sweden must be studied in order to emphasize the
different problems the Nordic countries face and to provide
a discussion of the Nordic security problems. Although this
2Egil Ulstein, Nordic Security , Adelphi Papers, no. 81
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies,
November 1971), p. 16.
11

Figure 2; Map of NATO's Northern Flank
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thesis deals with Norway, it is necessary to discuss Sweden and
Finland in order to fully understand regional security as re-
lated to the concepts of Nordic unity and the "Nordic Balance."
To avoid confusion, some explanation of terms is necessary.
The Nordic Area refers to the five countries of Norway, Sweden,
Finland, Denmark, Iceland and their territories. The terms
Scandinavia and Scandinavian, although not always applicable
to Finland because of differences such as language, are
3generally accepted to refer to the same five countries and
will be used interchangeably with the Nordic Area.
For purposes of this discussion, Norway, Sweden and
Finland are used to examine the problems facing the Nordic
Area. Iceland and Denmark are mentioned in discussion of the
Scandinavian problems, but are not examined in detail.
The history of Nordic unity and cooperation can be traced
to the Napoleonic period and the Congress of Vienna. As
compensation resulting from the Rus so -Swedish War, Finland
was lost by Sweden in 1809. In 1814, Sweden acquired Norway
from Denmark as a result of joining the coalition against
Napoleon. Except for the Danish war with Prussia in 1864,
the Scandinavian countries were able to maintain a peaceful
existance until the beginning of World War II.
Norway declared its independence in 1905 and elected a
Danish King. Finland proclaimed independence in 1917 after
the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Iceland separated itself
3Donald S. Connery, The Scandinavians (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1966), p. 11.
13

from Denmark in 1941 and was established as an independent
republic in 1944. From these beginnings, the present govern-
ments of the Scandinavian countries have grown: two republics
4
and three constitutional monarchies, all democracies.
The Scandinavian countries were able to maintain their
neutrality throughout World War I . Other than restrictions
made necessary by the Allied blockade of Germany during the
war, neutrality appeared to work well for the Nordic Area
and the Nordic countries saw little necessity for defense
building following the war. They became active members in
the League of Nations and believed firmly in their neutral
stance
.
In 1939, Norway, Sweden and Finland rejected Germany's
offer to sign a mutual non-aggression pact, believing such
action a form of commitment unnecessary for neutral states.
Denmark alone agreed to the pact. The invasion of Finland
by Russia in 1939 and the invasion of Denmark and Norway by
Germany in 1940 shocked the Nordic countries. The Scandin-
avian desire for neutrality was ignored in the struggle for
natural resources and geographic location that had great
significance to neighbors already involved in war.
The geographic position which had once offered security
had become significant in a war which had changed through
improved technology. Scandinavia controlled the sea lanes
to Northern Europe and also held iron ore necessary for
Franklin D. Scott, Scandinavia (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1975), pp. 33-35.
14

German war industry. The geographies location important in
World War II will be discussed later, as its importance has
increased in the post war era.
Following the war, the Scandinavian governments agreed
that actions must be taken to insure security for the future.
Military alliances meant a clear break with the Nordic
tradition of nonalignment or neutrality, but an alliance
appeared the only practical way of achieving security.
Negotiations for a Nordic Defense Union proved negative
when Norway, Denmark and Sweden could not agree with regard
to foreign policy commitments. This pact would have allowed
a mutual defense agreement under conditions of nonalignment
with East or West. All three governments initially favored
the Union, but security could not be insured without outside
assistance, particularly in weapons. The United States was
unwilling to supply countries other than its immediate allies
and Sweden was unwilling to join any alliance outside the
Nordic Area.
When agreement could not be reached for a Nordic Defense
Union, the Norwegian government became convinced that Norway's
security policy could only be defended through a defensive
alliance with major western powers. In 1949, Norway became
a charter member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Denmark followed Norway's lead, and her sovereignty over
5 Ibid, p. 215.
James A. Storing, Norwegian Democracy (Bostons Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1963), pp. 214-215.
15

Greenland stretched the alliance across the North Atlantic.
Iceland's decision to join NATO was based on its need for
protection and its location for bases.
Sweden, following the collapse of an attempt at a
Nordic alliance, was determined to remain nonaligned in
peacetime and neutral in the event of war. The Swedish
people considered joining the NATO alliance, but feared
doing so would threaten Finland's independence and decided
the best course was continued neutrality. Finland had little
choice but to sign a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet
Union in order to maintain that independence
.
B. THE "NORDIC BALANCE"
The "Nordic Balance" is a widely held Scandinavian
belief that a delicate defense balance exists restraining
the Soviet Union from occupying Finland or even parts of
northern Norway. The elements of this balance are:
1) A desire not to provoke the Soviet Union unnecessarily.
2) A Finland that has complicated ties with both Nordic
and Soviet interests.
3) An assumption that Swedish nonalignment is necessary
to keep the Nordic nations delicately poised between
East and West.
4) A similar assumption concerning the desirability of
tenuous links between NATO and the two Scandinavian
members, Norway and Denmark.
8
This belief is the major reason for the "base policy" of
Norway and Denmark and its basis was the wish to avoid any
Egil Ulstein, "The Nordic Countries in a Changing
Europe," Military Review
.
September 1972, p. 52.
o
James J. Robbins , Strengthening NATO's Scandinavian
Flank
.




policy which could be interpreted as a provocation against
the Soviet Union.
The "base policy" is a qualification to NATO membership
for both Norway and Denmark. This policy prevents foreign
troops from being based on Norwegian or Danish soil in
peacetime, except for a limited number of NATO staff officers.
The policy also prevents nuclear arms from being stockpiled
in either country at any time. These qualifications were
made to indicate their membership in the alliance was
defensive rather than allowing the alliance to use their
territories for offensive purposes.
Denmark and Norway have chosen to restrict the effect
of their Alliance membership but retained the freedom
to remove these restrictions whenever they consider
that the explicitly stated conditions on which they
are based no longer apply.
9
The "base policy" has been emphasized as an important
point in the maintenance of the "Nordic Balance . " In
October 1961, when Khrushchev notified the Finnish govern-
ment requesting mutual military consultation provided for
under their Mutual Assistance Agreement, the Norwegian
Foreign Minister quickly responded that Norway's restriction
on bases and nuclear weapons were to a large degree condi-
tional on the maintenance of Finnish neutrality. In addition,
if the Soviet Union was considering changes in Finland's
status, Norway would have to reconsider its "base policy."
The consultation demands were dropped by the Soviets and






Since the "Nordic Balance" is based on Finland's
continued independence and relationship with the Soviet
Union, it is a good place to begin in describing the
Scandinavian countries' very different problems. "Finland
is a fiercely independent country, but its independence is
compromised by the facts of life in its relationship with
the Soviet Union:' Sharing a border of almost eight hundred
miles with the Soviet Union, Finland is the most prosperous
and democratic of all the countries bordering directly on
the Soviet Union (excluding Norway, whose border with the
Soviet Union was created by border adjustments following
World War II). Finland's border is the third longest of the
countries bordering the Soviet Union, ranking behind China
and Mongolia.
Being a Russian neighbor has never been easy. As Scott
points out in the plaint of an anonymous Finn, "Oh, why did
our forefathers fall in love with these lakes and woods and
settle here? Why didn't they keep on moving west? Then
someone else could be Russia's neighbor." In all, Finland
12has fought 42 wars with Russia and lost them all. Although
fierce warriors, the Finns have always suffered from a small
population (particularly compared with Russia), a location
strategic to Russian interests, and a lack of allies in war.
Connery
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In fact, the only real support ever offered Finland against
Russia came from Germany, twice offering assistance while at
war with Russia herself, twice being a loser in world wars
and if anything, hurting Finland's position in post war
negotiations.
Finland lived under Swedish rule for seven centuries. In
1809, Finland became a Russian grand duchy following the
Russian-Swedish War of 1808. Although ruled by the Tsar,
Finland enjoyed more freedom under Russian domination than
most Russian territory. Finnish nationalism grew during the
first fifty years of Russian hegemony. Under Nicholas II,
a russification period was suffered and when the Russian
Revolution took place in 1917, the Finns quickly declared
13their independence.
A civil war between Reds and Whites ended after three and
a half months and determined that the country would have a
democratic government. Initially a monarchy was favored,
but within a year the parliament voted for a republic with
a single house parliament and a president elected by a
14popularly chosen electoral college.
In 1932, Finland declared itself to be neutral and the
same year signed a nonaggression treaty with the Soviets.
The Soviets, fearing that Finland might ally themselves
with Germany, constantly sought evidence from the Finns
that they understood the security problem faced by the
13Anatole G. Mazour, Finland, Between East and West





Soviet Union. The Soviets asked for base rights in Finnish
territory to protect the Gulf of Finland and Leningrad. In
addition, constant agitation existed in the Karelian area
over what part of Karelia should be Finnish territory. The
Finnish government had successfully fought an ant i -Communist
campaign within Finland during the 1930' s and the Soviets
were concerned that Finland had anti-Soviet intentions.
In 1939, the Nazi-Soviet secret pact placed Finland in
the Soviet's sphere of influence. When new demands for base
rights and other concessions were made of the Finnish govern-
ment and turned down, and after the German invasion of Poland,
the Soviets invaded Finland expecting easy victory. The
Soviets instead faced intense fighting and finally settled
after five difficult months. The Finns had been unable to
get support during the war except supplies from Sweden.
Germany wouldn't break its treaty with the Soviets and pre-
vented the Italians from assisting. The United States was
still attempting to stay out of the European affair, and when
Great Britain and France prepared to send help, the Norwegians
and Swedes refused to allow crossing rights, claiming breach
of neutrality. In the peace negotiations, Finland was forced
to give up territory and base rights to the Soviets.
The Soviet invasion of Finland resulted in Hitler's belief
that the Soviets were weak militarily and he seriously under-
estimated their capabilities. Strangely enough, had the




later alliance with the Soviets probably could not have
occurred. The "Winter War" was not the end of Finnish-Soviet
conflict in the Second World War.
The Finns were drawn into the war again on the German
side and soon found themselves in a "continuation war" with
the Soviets. As the German war effort began to fail, Finland
was forced into signing a separate armistice with the Soviets,
Not only were the reparations staggering, but the Finns had
to drive the remaining Germans out of the country, resulting
in a "scorched earth" retreat by the Germans. In addition,
Finland had lost the respect of the western world for siding
with the Nazis. The result was loss of territory and Soviet
domination of Finland in the post war era.
The Soviet influence in Finland's foreign policy and
internal affairs has resulted in what westerners describe as
"Finlandization.
"
The term "Finlandization" —meaning that process or
state of affirs in which, under the cloak, of . maintaining
friendly relations with the Soviet Union, the sovereignty
of a country becomes reduced—has entered the political
dictionary despite the protests of Helsinki, Helsinki's




Still Finlandization is not the worst of possibilities for
18Finland. The country remains a democratic republic,
independent, with a great deal more freedom than is normally
Mazour, pp. 135-177.
Walter Laquer, "Europe: The Specter of Finlandization,"
Commentary , December 1977, p. 37.
18Jaakko Nousiainen, The Finnish Political System , trans.




recognized. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has a definite
grip on Finnish foreign policy and Finnish leaders realize
the hostage position in which the country exists.
Juko Paasikivi, prime minister from November 1944 to
March 1946 and then president, implemented a policy of
improving relations with the Soviet Union, a policy known
as the Paasikivi line. Paasikivi stated on Finnish
Independence Day, December 6, 1944,
Finnish foreign policy is governed by our relations
with our great neighbour in the East, the Soviet Union.
This is the real problem in our foreign policy, and we
have to find a solution to it, for the future of our
nation depends on it. We have just signed a truce with
the Soviet Union. . .we are all agreed that the pro-
visions of this truce must be conscientiously fulfilled.
But above and beyond this, we must establish a relation-
ship of mutual trust with our great neighbour. Suspi-
cion must be banished, friendship must prevail. I am
convinced that it is in the best interests of our nation
that Finnish foreign policy should never be led into
paths hostile to the Soviet Union. 1°
Nordic cooperation has already been discussed and
the cooperation that continued immediately after the war
was developed at first quite cautiously. This relation-
ship was emphasized by Paasikivi as well.
Our social organization and our outlook on life have
been determined by nearly 700 years of association
with Sweden. This and the fact that our nation
includes a considerable Swedish- speaking population,
have led to the establishment of close cultural and
economic ties with our western neighbour and with
other Scandinavian countries. 20
19Hillar Kallas and Sylvia Nickels, ed. , Finland
,
Creation and Construction (London: George Allen and Unwin
Ltd., 1968), p. 37.
20




President Paasikivi was successful in gaining a good
deal of trust from the Soviet Union considering that the
Soviets withdrew their troops from the Porkkala naval base
in 1955 and returned it to the Finns, 42 years before the
lease expired as stated in the Finnish Peace Treaty. This
strengthened Finland's nonaligned position in terms of
international status. President Paasikivi stated on
July 31, 1955,
Good relations with Russia are, and always will be of
prime importance to Finland. Geography and history
have determined this. In foreign policy we must think
geographically, as I have said before, but one cannot
repeat it too often. Some people so easily forget to
look at the map. And what does history teach us?
Although it does not always repeat itself, as was once
thought, it is true that all the military engagements
that we have been involved in with -Russia in the past
250 years have ended in disaster for Finland, whereas
we have often achieved worthwhile results when we have
met the Russians round a table. In the history of our
people the pen has repaired what the sword had broken.
"
Finland and the Soviet Union signed an Agreement of
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in 1948,
subsequently reaffirmed in 1955 and 1970. Unlike the mutual
defense alliances that the Soviets have concluded with
Eastern European countries, Finland is required only to
defend its own territory against aggression or to prevent
aggression toward the Soviet Union across Finnish territory.
The Soviet Union will assist, "in case of need," when the
22two nations agree "between themselves." This agreement
21
Ibid, p. 38, interview with Dagen Nyketer.
22Theodore L. Stoddard et al
.
, Area Handbook for Finland
(Kashington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 215.
24

"represented the first international recognition of Finland's
23
neutrality-nonalignment orientation.
The policy of neutrality was not emphasized during the
Paasikivi era, but his successor President Urko Kekkonen
has stressed this policy in the international arena. Finland
has taken an active role in international affairs . After
joining the United Nations in 1955, Finnish troops have often
participated in UN peace-keeping missions and Finnish officers
have commanded UN forces. In UN decisions, however, neutrality
and Soviet influence are noticeable. Finland has abstained
from voting on issues which involve the interests of the
great powers, particularly if the Soviet Union is involved.
Consequently, the Finnish delegation did not vote on condem-
nation of Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956, in Czecho-
slovakia in 1968 , or on resolutions concerning the Middle
East in 1967 or 1973.
The Soviets occassionly make it clear to Finland that
policies not in accordance with Soviet interests will not
be tolerated. In 1958, the Soviet Union didn't approve of
the new organization of the government. The Soviet ambassador
was recalled and trade was curtailed with Finland. After
a new State Council was formed, the situation was resolved.
The Soviets also watch German participation in NATO very
closely and any German involvement in the Nordic area is
loudly protested as a threat as defined in the Mutual Assis-




able to avoid actions by the Soviets under the agreement,
24
other than protests.
Because of the unique relationship Finland has with
the Soviet Union, detente greatly benefits the Finns 1
relationships with other nations. As long as tensions are
relaxed, the Finns enjoy their independence. During periods
of tension, the Finnish government is expected to keep in
line with Soviet policies and their freedom of action is
restrained.
D . SWEDEN
Sweden is the only Nordic country which has been able to
avoid war and alliances for 160 years. Three basic reasons
25
account for this fact: "history, geography and good luck."
Since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Sweden has been content
as a minor player in the international environment, content
in developing economically and industrially. Sweden's
geographic location, in the center of Scandinavia, has pro-
vided a natural buffer from the great powers . During World
War II, Sweden was the only Scandinavian country which escaped
occupation.
Swedish foreign policy is based on neutrality, or more
precisely, "alliance-free in peace, aimed at a policy of
neutrality in case of a major war. Sweden was very much
24Connery, pp. 502-504.
25Joseph B. Board, Jr., The Government and Politics of
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isolationist until after World War I. Participation in the
League of Nations was the beginning of active involvement in
world affairs. The policy of neutrality in war was seriously
threatened when the Soviets invaded Finland in 1939. Although
remaining neutral , Sweden did provide arms and volunteer
assistance to Finland. The occupation of Norway and Denmark
was an even greater shock to the Swedes and certainly the
Germans could have occupied Sweden as well , if they had so
decided. Sweden's only direct involvement with foreign troops
was a brief transit agreement, requested by the Nazis and
Finland, under which German troops were allowed to cross from
Norway to Finland.
After World War II and the failure of the Nordic Defense
Union attempt, Sweden was determined to remain free of
alliances (although NATO membership had been discussed),
"Out of a desire to remain neutral in the event of a shooting
war, but to keep Sweden out of the cold war at a time when
Swedish participation would probably have resulted in the
27destruction of Finland's independence." Sweden was one of
a few nations to keep its defense forces in a high state of
readiness, aware that the Soviets were much more powerful
than ever before.
Although nonaligned, Sweden is definitely pro -Western
and would look to the West for assistance if attacked. The
likelihood of attack from anywhere is doubtful, but Sweden





country its size. The Swedes are realistic enough to realize
that their only hope would be to hold off an attacker long
enough for help to arrive. Sweden's deceptive image is much
like "a prim lady. . .armed not with a long hat pin. . .but
TO
a submachine gun and a dozen hand grenades."
Sweden's involvement in the United Nations began in 1946.
Not a charter member, Sweden's role since entrance has been
very active. The Swedish representatives have consistently
worked for disarmament, particularly concerning nuclear
weapons, and relaxation of East-West tensions. Swedish forces
have participated frequently in United Nations peace keeping
missions and the Swedish government supports all aid programs
29for underdeveloped nations.
Sweden's role in the "Nordic Balance" is that of a wedge
or fulcrum. History, geography and ideology place Sweden in
the center as the balance point for Scandinavian affairs.
The maintenance of Swedish nonalignment is critical to the
"Nordic Balance." Sweden has frequently voiced the importance
of detente and emphasizes the important role the small nations
can play in lessening East-West tensions.
E. NORDIC UNITY
In order to understand the basis for the "Nordic Balance"
and the close relationships that exist among the Scandinavian
countries, a brief study of Nordic unity is helpful. Long







were organized, Scandinavian cooperation had begun. The
similarity of heritages and cultures provided the beginnings
for cooperation socially, politically and economically.
Although the military alliance concept was unsuccessful,
the conferences led to the establishment of the Nordic
Council. Created in 1952, the Council meets annually to
discuss judicial, economic, cultural and social matters. No
formal headquarters exists and the meetings take place in a
different Scandinavian capital each year. Its membership is
elected from each country and cabinet ministers often attend
the meetings. Recommendations by the Council on matters of
interest are usually acted upon by each of the five countries.
By the mid-fifties the Council was debating the idea of
a Nordic Common Market. In 1959, the European Free Trade
Area was formed with Great Britain and several other European
countries. This arrangement benefited everyone since Great
Britain was the principal market for all the Scandinavian
countries. By 1961, Finland was allowed an associate
membership (in order to satisfy Soviet misgivings) and the
Scandinavian countries found increased markets between each
other as a result of the association. Great Britain and
Denmark dropped out of the association after joining the
European Economic Community, but trade between the remaining
partners remains active. Norway's attempt at EEC entry was
rejected in a national referendum. All the Nordic countries




Nordic Unity exists in other areas as well. The degree to
which cooperation exists cannot be fully documented. The
daily contact between governmental departments through meetings,
messages and phone calls is staggering and impossible to track.
All five countries have a common passport area for their
citizens. The labor market was opened in 1954 when the
countries signed a convention dispensing with work permits
in each other's countries. Education is greatly affected by
the cooperation between countries. Entrance examinations as
well as scholarships and student loans are available for
interchange of students. Nordic Unity can be found in almost
every area of life making the Nordic Area the most integrated
group of independent countries in the world.
The Scandinavian, countries strongly supported international
organizations following World War II. They quickly joined
the Council of Europe in 1949, actively participating,
although the Council's efforts have been limited. Scandinavia
was eager to show the importance of small nations in the new
international system. As Scott points out, "All had learned
that international organization was the only hope for them
30
and the world." Norway had participated in the United
Nations organization from the beginning. This was possible
even during the war, since the Norwegian government spent the
war years in London. Denmark joined the United Nations after
liberation in 1945, Sweden and Iceland gained admission in




As Scott describes, "Finland
. . .wanted to join, every one professed to want her
in, but she was caught in the rivalry of East and
West. When the United Nations refused to admit
certain of the Russian satellite states, the USSR
retaliated by delaying the inclusion of Finland,
but she was admitted in 1955. 31
Scandinavian cooperation has proved effective in inter-
national organizations. The Nordic countries actively take
part in United Nations peacekeeping efforts and Nordic
statesmen are frequently asked to mediate or lead negotia-




III. STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHICAL IMPORTANCE
A. THE KOLA PENINSULA
The Kola Peninsula is of particular importance to
Soviet Naval strategy. The ice free ports of Murmansk and
Poliarnyi are located on the peninsula and have historically
been used by Russia as major sea ports. Following World
War II, the Soviets gained additional territory on the
peninsula by annexing territory from Finland. The annex-
ation gained the Petsama region, an additional port and
naval base at Pechenga, and formed a common border of
195.7 km (122 miles) between Norway and the USSR.
The importance of these ports can easily be seen when
considering the organization and location of the Soviet Navy.
The Navy is organized into four fleets: The Pacific Fleet,
the Northern Fleet (in the Murmansk area), and the Baltic
33
and Black Sea Fleets. The Pacific Fleet has secure access
to ports but is not close enough to support operations in
the Atlantic area, the scene of the most probable crisis to
the Russian Navy. The Baltic and Black Sea Fleets are unable
to maneuver from their home ports without passing through
straits controlled by NATO member nations. Thus, their
32Trevor Lloyd, "The Norwegian-Soviet Boundary, A Study
in Political Geography," (Dartmouth College, Hanover, February
1954), p. 1.
~Vlax B. Scheider, "The Significance of North Norway to
NATO Military Strategy," (Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
21 May 1976), pp. 18-19.
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movements are closely observed and access routes could
effectively be blocked by NATO forces in times of crisis.
This illustrates the importance of the ports on the Kola
Peninsula. A priority has been placed there on construction
of harbor defenses and shelters for submarines and other
small warships.
The severe climate of the area would seem to be a
disadvantage, however, the population of the area has almost
tripled since World War II and industrial production is
eight time what it was in 1940. Over 20% of the total of
Soviet fish products is provided by a fishing fleet of close
to 500 vessels that operated from the peninsula. The area
is rich in mineral resources, particularly rare metals and
other minerals, and will be of greater importance to the
34Soviet economy as these resources are exploited.
The military forces stationed on the peninsula include
two motorized infantry divisions (24,000 men), members of
the Leningrad Military District who are permanently stationed
in the area. An additional 2-5 motorized divisions are
assigned to the district and could be used to support the
local forces. In addition, a naval infantry (marine) brigade
of 2,000 men is permanently located on the peninsula. The
marines and both motorized divisions are equipped with
amphibious tanks and are trained in amphibious operations.
Over 40 airfields are located on the peninsula, of which
Johan J^rgen Hoist, ed. , Five Roads to Nordic Security
,
(Oslo: Universitetsforlaget , 1973), p. 90.
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about 10 can support modern aircraft. Approximately 300
aircraft (including helicopters) of the 500 belonging to
the Leningrad Military District are deployed to airfields
•
-*, 35m the area.
Of major importance, as previously mentioned, is the
Northern Fleet. This fleet is made up of approximately 500
ships and craft and 10,000 men. Because of frequent reassign-
ment among fleets, estimates of this fleet must be constantly
updated. Latest estimates have included 30 cruisers and
destroyers, 35 ocean going escorts, 25 landing ships, 25
missile carrying patrol boats, 150-200 smaller vessels, and
Of.
180-185 submarines of which 70-80 are nuclear powered.
The concentration of naval power in dne area has been
explained as availability of port facilities from which to
maneuver. This buildup of forces has a definate effect on
Norway as the only Northern European NATO country which
37borders directly on the Soviet Union.
B. NORTHERN NORWAY
The value of Northern Norway from a strategic point
of view is primarily geographical. Control of this area
provides a significant vantage point of polar air routes
and naval access routes between North America and the Soviet
35Scheider, p. 16.
Edgar Prina, "A New Look at NATO," Military Review
,
July 1977, p. 30.
37John H. Roush Jr., "Norway's Significance from a
Military Point of View," Military Review
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Union. In this respect, both NATO and the Soviet Union
could benefit from such control
.
From a aerial viewpoint, Northern Norway could provide
early warning of either intercontinental ballistic missiles
or conventional aircraft utilizing the most direct route
between the two continents. In addition to early warning
surveillance, the area could also provide an excellent
location for forward bases for interceptor aircraft and
missiles. The airfields in the area would also provide
excellent forward strike bases to the south, from a Soviet
point of view, and against the growing Soviet threat by
NATO forces. 38
The Soviet naval force, already mentioned, has adequate
port facilities on the Kola Peninsula. However, the Soviet
Northern Fleet requires ease of access to the Atlantic
Ocean, preferably unobserved, in order to be an effective
force. Northern Norway flanks this access route to the
Atlantic and provides a strategic vantage point for NATO
air and sea reconnaissance and electronic surveillance
39
equipment. The rugged Norwegian coastline provides
excellent areas from which NATO submarines can operate; and
the Norwegian and Barents Seas offer optimum zones for
40Polaris submarine operations.
Intelligence estimates indicate that control of Northern
Scheider, p. 24.
39Arthur E. Dewey, "The Nordic Balance," Strategic Review ,




Norway is considered necessary by the Soviets in order to
41deploy their Northern Fleet. The Soviets could enjoy the
same benefits from the extensive Norwegian coastline as NATO
forces. This coast could be used to disperse the Northern
Fleet and provide closer positions to interdict Atlantic
sea routes. The numerous airfields in the area could provide
much better air cover for their fleet, increasing the time on
station for aircraft, and reducing the vulnerability of the
fleet.
C . SVALBARD
The Svalbard archipelago is located half way between
Norway and the North Pole, approximately 400 miles north of
Norway's northern coast. Included in the island group is the
largest group, Spitsbergen, and Bear Island, a small island
42half way between northern Norway and Spitsbergen.
The entire land mass of the archipelago is 24,000
square miles of icy mountains, glaciers and thick permafrost.
Named Spitsbergen by the Dutch explorer Barents, who first
mapped their location, Svalbard is the Norwegian name
referring to the entire group of islands between latitude
74 and 81 N and longitude 10 and 35 E. The names given this
remote area describe it very well. The Dutch name Spits-
bergen, Land of Pointed Mountains, give an indication of the
41 Drew Middleton, "NATO Voices Concern over Weakness of
Northern Defenses," New York Times , 15 December 1971, p. Cl2.
42
R.W. Apple Jr. , "Soviet and Norway Spar in Arctic
Waters," New York Times , 6 August 1978, p. 2.
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rough terrain covering much of the land. The Norwegian
name Svalbard, Land with Frozen Shores, better describes a
land nearly 60% covered with ice or frozen in areas to a
43depth of 300 meters.
The description of the archipelago makes understanding
its importance difficult. Considering the Spitsbergen
island group is frozen in pack ice for most of the year,
international disagreements in the area seem unlikely. Until
the beginning of the 19th Century, European whalers fought
over the area in the summer time and had been wintering on
the islands for 150 years. With the extinction of the Green-
land whale, hunters, trappers and fishermen kept the quarrel
over the area open until an American company began coal
mining operations in 1906. Since then, coal mining has been
the major industry on the islands.
The Norwegian government gained sovereignty over the
Svalbard archipelago in 1920 under the International Treaty
44
of Paris, signed by over forty nations. Although Norway
maintains sole sovereignty under the terms of the treaty,
all signatories retained equal economic rights for develop-
ment of resources. In addition, all military activity was
banned from the island group.
The Soviet Union was not one of the original signatories
to the Svalbard Treaty, but recognized Norwegian sovereignty
43Gordon Young, "Norway's Strategic Arctic Islands,"
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in 1924. The Norwegian government ratified the treaty in
1925 and the Soviet Union acceded to the treaty without
reservations in 1935. Since 1924, Norway and the Soviet
Union have been the only two countries to maintain active
45business concerns on the island group.
The Norwegians purchased the original coal mining
operation from the American company in 1916. Since 1932,
when the Soviets bought a coal operation from a Dutch
company, the Soviets and Norwegians have been the only two
countries of the treaty signatories to take advantage of
exploiting Svalbard's natural resources.
Although the Soviets outnumber the Norwegians on the
island by more than two to one, each country's annual output
of coal is about the same (about 450,000 tons a year).
The productivity of the Soviets is not low when compared with
normal production output in the Soviet Donetz basin. How-
ever, the quantity of coal produced by the Soviets on Spits-
bergen is very small compared with their needs; and the coal
they are getting is not particularly good quality. Both
facts indicate that the Soviets have other interests than
coal mining which keep them on the archipelago . According
to some reports, most of the Soviets are actually "military
47





"Norway. The Next Richest Nation. A Survey." The
Economist
. 15 November 1975, pp. 20-22.




Lief Eldring, former Governor of Spitsbergen, explains
it this way,
I'm sure there is no military activity. Everything
I have asked to see in four years they showed me,
although I wouldn't pretend to know whether they have a
radio listening post or things like that. They don't
really need the coal. They use it as an excuse to keep
a presence here, to keep an eye on other people. °
D. MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE
The geographical location that had helped keep Norway
out of European wars in the 19th century became the primary
reason for invasion in the 20th century. In World War I,
the sea lanes around Norway's northern cape had been used by
the Allies to supply Russia by way of Murmansk. Norway had
been able to maintain neutrality in World War I, in spite
of this fact.
In World War II, this close proximity to the major North
Atlantic shipping lanes became of significant military
importance. Winston Churchill spoke of Norway's "immense
49
strategic significance", recognizing the damage the Germans
could inflict on British shipping of war material with sub-
marines operating from the Norwegian coast. In addition,
the possibility of German air strikes from the Norwegian
airstrip threatened British shipping as well as the British
coast.
At the same time , the Chief of the German Naval Staff
,
Raeder, took the view that a British occupation of Norway
43Apple, "Soviet and Norway Spar", p. 2.
49Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm
,
(Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), p. 531.
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would be fatal to Germany, interrupting the supply of
Swedish iron ore to Germany, and allowing England to intensify
her air war on Germany. The Naval Staff considered "the
loss of Norway to England would be synonymous with losing
the war. In discussing the invasion of Norway with General
Falkenhorst, Adolf Hitler called the Norwegian coast "a
strategic turning point." At this time in the war the
strategic significance of the Arctic was still small, since
Germany and the Soviet Union were at peace
.
Both leader's assessments of Norway's significant location
were correct. Hitler, however, surprised both Norway and
Great Britain by invading Norway on April 9, 1940. Norway
resisted, but was ill prepared for a major invasion, assuming
that neutrality was possible as it had been in World War I.
The effects of five years of German occupation will never
be forgotten by the Norwegians. Their resistance efforts
during the war were effective and they resolved never to be
unprepared for national defense or suffer occupation again.
After the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany, the
Allied supply convoys to the Soviet ports in Murmansk were
constantly hit by German torpedo - bombers , utilizing Norwegian
fjords. This harassmant accounted for critical losses to
Allied convoys and for a time, caused a complete halt in
convoy operations
.
Great Britain Admiralty, The German Campaign in Norway
,




Military interest in Spitsbergen also increased during
World War II. The Allies and Germans fought over control of
the islands for communications use with the Norwegians finally
gaining control in 1943. In retaliation, the Germans
destroyed most of the settlements (as they did across most
of northern Norway and Finland), in this case, through the
efforts of a naval force. The Norwegians, however, maintained
a garrison until after the war, when all the settlements
were rebuilt.
The Soviet Union quickly realized the military signifi-
cance and attempted to gain more control of the archipelago
for the Norwegians or to establish a bilateral Soviet -Norwegian
concern, thus circumventing the Svalbard Treaty. At the end
of World War II the Soviet government proposed that Norway
and the Soviet Union organize a joint defense of Svalbard
and that Norway cede Bear Island to the Soviets. The Nor-
wegians countered that any revision of the International
Treaty of 1920 concerning defense of the island group should
be decided as a part of a universal arrangement by post war
world organizations.
In October 1951, the Soviet government officially
protested Norway's participation in NATO's joint command
arrangement, claiming that the Atlantic command was author-
ized to take such military measures in the areas around the
52Earl F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations
1940-1945
,
(Washington: Department of the Army, 1959), pp. 235-268.
53Ronald G. Popperwell , Norway
,
(New York: Praeger
Publishers, Inc., 1972), p. 181.
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archipelago as would constitute a violation of Article 9
of the Svalbard Treaty. The Norwegian government rejected
the protest, emphasizing that no military fortifications
would be permitted on Spitsbergen or Bear Island. A more
recent press report in The New York Times in 1974 indicated
that the Soviets were again pressuring the Norwegian govern-
ment for a bilateral arrangement in control of the Svalbard
54group.
54
"Oslo Expects Soviets to Ask Joint Spitsbergen Rule,"
The New York Times , 6 October 1974, p. 10.
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IV. SECURITY PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IN THE 1970'
s
A . SVALBARD
Although relations between the Norwegians and Soviets on
Svalbard have always been peaceable, the Soviet government
uses every possible excuse to protest Norwegian actions or
challenge Norwegian authority. No local government existed
on Svalbard until 1971. Since it was established, new
attempts have been made to control administrative details
locally and provide more services that had previously been
provided by the Norwegian coal company. The local governor
frequently has to remind the Soviets that he alone is
responsible for administering the islands. Although the
Soviets on Svalbard are subject to the same income tax as the
Norwegians, they refuse to supply a list of residents eligible
to be taxed, paying the tax for the entire group in one lump
55
sum.
The Norwegian government has frequently reminded the
Soviet government that Norway has complete sovereignty over
Svalbard and will administer it as properly authorized by
the treaty. The Soviets have resented even the minimal steps
insisted on by the Norwegians as incidental to soversignty
including:
Regular safety inspections of the mines, which the
Norwegians are specifically required to undertake
by the treaty, and of oil -drilling operations.
Apple, "Soviet and Norway Spar," p. 2.
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Action against illegal hunting.




Control of the use of radio transmitters.
The longe.st lasting dispute continued for almost twenty
years concerning the building of an airport for year round
transportation from Norway. As early as 1956, plans were
discussed by the government in Oslo to build a civilian air-
strip. The Soviets protested that the airfield would be yet
another link in the chain of NATO airfields. These protests
delayed the project for fifteen years. Finally in 1973, the
Norwegian government approved construction of an airfield,
informing all parties of the treaty concerning the decision
to build. Demands by the Soviet Union for a major repre-
sentation in the administration and operations of the air-
field were rejected by the Norwegian government. In March
1974, the two countries finally reached an agreement "per-
mitting Norway to build an all-year airport on West Spits-
bergen (for civil use only). . . The agreement also
enables Soviet aircraft to utilize the Norwegian state-owned
^ 58airport.
The permanent airport was opened in August 1975 as part
of a celebration emphasizing the 50th anniversary of "full
and unlimited sovereignty" over the archipelago.
56
"Norway. The Next Richest Nation.", p. 22.
Hoist, Five Roads, pp. 110-111.
58
"Soviet-Norwegian Spitsbergen Agreement," Norway
,
Deadline Data on World Affairs , 7 March 1974, p. 29.
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The opening of the airport began a new area of conflict
with the Soviets. The new airport allowed a monthly landing
from Aeroflot, the Soviet airline. Although there was only
one Aeroflot flight a month, the Soviets insisted on a
significant staff, permanently settled at the airport site.
When a planeload of "wives of the staff" arrived (along with
a load of twin beds), the governor of Svalbard objected,
finally compromising on a total staff of six to handle the
59
monthly Aeroflot flight. Thus the apparent Soviet attempt
at increased airport control was ended.
In November 1976, the Oslo Arbeiderbladet ran an
interview with Svalbard District Governor Leif Eldering
which discussed the Soviet helicopter base at Cape Heer on
Spitsbergen. Eldering stated that after several inspections
he could determine that it was not a military base, but
questioned the need for the extremely large helicopters
the Soviets had stationed on the base. In addition, the
Russians had not requested licenses for the new helicopters,
permission to build a landing site, or flight clearance for
the helicopters. All of these requirements were clearly
laid down in the 1973 air traffic regulations. The Soviets
had licensed and requested clearance for the original
smaller helicopters, which had been replaced.
59
"Keeping the Cold War on Ice," Manchester Guardian
,
28 May 1978, p. 9.
f\ n
"Svalbard Official: No Military Base at Cape Heer,"
Arbeiderbladet (Oslo), 9 November 1976, p. 13, translated in
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe
,
11 November 1976, p. PI.
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Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund has commented
on Norwegian policy on Svalbard and Norwegian-Soviet dis-
agreements on several occasions. In an address to the
Norwegian parliament he said, "On Svalbard, clear, correct
and effective exercise of sovereignty on the basis of the
61
treaty is the main feature of the government's policy.
In a new year interview for the Norwegian Telegraph
Bureau, Foreign Minister Frydenlund described Norwegian-Soviet
relations on Svalbard, "The unresolved problems on Svalbard
in relation to the Soviet Union apply to administrative
questions.... The Russians disagree with us on issues con-
cerning conservation, safety while drilling for oil, air
traffic and other regulations."
In September 1977, Foreign Minister Frydenlund formally
protested Soviet actions on Svalbard to Soviet Ambassador
to Oslo, Kirichenko. One of the five large helicopters
(capable of carrying 30 passengers) crashed on the south
point of Spitsbergen. It was first sighted by the Norwegians
when a research surveying team spotted the wreckage. The
cabin section was intact, but the main rotor had been torn
loose and the tail was destroyed. The Norwegians were
initially irritated since the flight had not been coordinated
"Frydenlund Presents Foreign Policy Review,"
Arbeiderbladet (Oslo), 14 December 1976, p. 17, translated
in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe
,
11 November 1976, p. PI.
6 ?
"Foreign Minister Hits 'Stagnant' Detente," Aftenposten
(Oslo), 4 January 1977, p. 4, translated in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service
, Western Europe, 10 January 1977, p. Pi -2
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with air traffic controllers, and the crash was not reported
to the district governor as required by air traffic law. The
crash had occurred one or two weeks before it was discovered,
and the crash site had been cleaned up, also illegal under
the air traffic law. The diplomatic protest was made after
the Soviets removed the wreckage from the crash site, before
civil aviation inspectors could inspect it. This action
violated both Norwegian and international laws.
The Soviets claimed that no one was killed in the crash
and that it was a forced landing, not a crash. The announced
mission of the aircraft was to survey glaciers with a group
f ^
of Soviet scientists on board.
In April 1978, the Soviets again violated Norwegian
regulations with their helicopters. Two Soviet helicopters
flew into the southern Spitsbergen National Park and
removed a jeep from an abandoned research station. No per-
mission had been granted to fly into the national park, and
the removal of equipment from the park was also illegal.
An editorial in the Oslo Aftenposten stated, "It looks as if
the Soviet Union is deliberately trying to undermine Norwegian
sovereignty over Svalbard. It is obvious that this is a
stance which is not liable to create a better relationship
64between two neighbors."
f *3
"Soviet Helicopter Wreckage Found on Spitsbergen,"
Aftenposten (Oslo), 18 August 1977
,
p. 4, translated in
FBIS, Western Europe , 23 August 1977, p. PI.
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Arbeiderbladet (Oslo), 7 September 1977, p. 6, translated in
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51

In August 1978, the Norwegians discovered that the Soviets
had set up a radar with a range in excess of 100 kilometers
for monitoring aircraft flights. The Soviets claimed they
needed the radar for use with their helicopters to provide
instrument flying capabilities. Once again the law was
broken. Permission to set up the radar station had not been
requested as required by law. The Norwegian authorities
increased their surveillance to determine if military activities
were being conducted on Svalbard, in clear violation of
ft s
international treaty and Norwegian sovereignty.
On the 4th of September 1978, another Soviet aircraft
crash was reported. This time a military plane crashed on
Svalbard (on the small island of Ho pen) killing all seven
Soviet passengers. The crash site was found first by
Norwegians; therefore, all the necessary regulations were
followed. A Soviet ship in the area arrived near the crash
site after a Norwegian Navy ship, consequently the scene was
investigated carefully before the Soviets could remove the
wreckage. The Soviet Union then sent an investigator to
observe the investigation and all diplomatic courtesies
were exchanged. If the Norwegians had not found the wreckage,
no doubt the Soviet ship would have cleaned up the site of
the crash without notifying Norwegian authorities, once again
violating international laws
.
Sovjet Har Satt Opp Radar Pa Svalbard, Ukens Nytt
,
1 September 1978, p. 7.
f\f\
Ukens Nytt . 4 September 1978, p. 1 and Nytt Fra Norge ,
5 September 1978, p. 1.
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The controversy over the crash continued through September
and October 1978. The Norwegians claimed the right to inves-
tigate and took the flight recorder (Black box) for examina-
tion to determine the cause of the crash. The Soviets were
extremely disturbed since the aircraft was military and the
tape contained its flight information for at least one days
missions. The Norwegian officials stood fast and even
requested assistance from outside aircraft accident investi-
gation agencies for assistance. They also offered the Soviets
the right to send a representative to observe the investigation.
The Soviet Ambassador responded with another protest and by
cancelling several planned Soviet governmental visits.
The Soviet Union has also protested Norwegian activities
claiming that military actions had taken place on Svalbard,
violating the 1920 treaty. In 1965, when a space telemetry
station for the European Space Research Organization (ESRO)
was erected on Spitsbergen, the Soviets immediately protested,
stating that Svalbard would be exploited for military uses,
threatening security of the Soviets on the Kola Peninsula.
The Norwegians disagreed with this interpretation, ignored
f\ 7
the protest and completed the ESRO station.
More recently, the Soviets have protested military ships
from Norway making annual visits to Spitsbergen. In
answering these charges, Defense Undersecretary Johan J^rgen
Hoist stated in the Aftenposten,
f\ 7
Hoist, Five Roads, pp. 110-111.
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The annual naval cruise is part of the normal
exercise of sovereignty and does not conflict
with the Svalbard Treaty. It is correct that
we have had an annual cruise- -so-called cadet
cruises- -with one Norwegian ship which calls
at Svalbard as part of the normal exercise of
sovereignty which Norway has carried out on
Svalbard throughout the period of the treaty.
Hoist went on to explain that the cadet cruises were not
in violation of the treaty's ninth article which prohibits
the fortification of Svalbard in case of war.
The Soviet actions on the Svalbard archipelago are
clearly an effort to gain more control over the island
group and/or to undermine the authority of the Norwegians.
Through a constant process of shouldering the Norwegians,
the Soviets hope to eventually push and find no resistance.
The Norwegian government must be constantly alert for Soviet
violations in order to maintain the sovereignty given them
under the 1920 Treaty of Paris.
B. OIL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Political pressures between the Soviet Union and Norway
have not been limited to the Svalbard archipelago. Discovery
of oil and gas in the North Sea promoted interest all along
the Norwegian coast. Studies of the ocean floor resulted in
predictions of tremendous fields of oil and natural gas in
the Norwegian and Barents Seas. These predictions raised
questions as to the sovereignty of the continental shelf.
"Officials Reject Soviet Criticism of Use of Svalbard,"
Aftenposten (Oslo), 8 August 1977
,
p. 4, translated in
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe
,
12 August 1977, p. Pl-3.
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The Norwegian position is based on the argument that
the Svalbard archipelago doesn't have its own continental
shelf, but rather that the whole area is an extension of the
continental shelf off northern Norway. They therefore claim
sovereignty over the entire ocean floor between the north
coast and the northern limit of Svalbard 's territorial limits.
The rights over territorial waters and ocean floors was
not determined in the 1920 Treaty of Paris. In fact, a
universal definition of undersea territorial sovereignty has
69
not been agreed upon throughout the world. This situation
leaves the territorial waters surrounding Svalbard in question.
The rights to the economic exploitation of natural resources
on the archipelago is guaranteed to all signatories who obey
the Norwegian laws. If the shelf in the area of the islands
is considered sovereign to the islands, then the signatories
would also have the right to exploitation of the ocean floor's
resources. If, as the Norwegians claim, the ocean floor is an
extension of their coastal shelf and continuous to a point
North of Spitsbergen, then the Norwegians have economic
rights to the entire shelf.
In order to determine the boundary between them, the
Soviet Union and Norway began talks in 1974 to delimit the
continental shelf in the Barents Sea. The Norwegians have
proposed that a median line be determined, similar to the
agreements reached in the North Sea. This argument is
69Loran W. Gierhart, "Offshore Oil and Northern Europe:
A Troubled Mix," (Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base,
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supported by the provisions of the 1958 Geneva Convention
on law of the sea and has precedence in the case of the
North Sea. Interestingly enough, the Norwegians did not
sign the 1958 Geneva Convention, but by Royal Decree in 1970,
established baselines to be used in the demarcation of the
territorial sea for a major portion of Svalbard.
The Soviet proposal is based on the division of Ant-
arctica and calls for delimitation of Arctic sectors running
south from the North Pole. The disputed area between the two
methods of delimitation amounts to nearly 60,000 square miles.
Formal negotiations between the two nations began in November
1974, but little has been accomplished in reaching any type
of settlement.
The present status of Law of the Sea conferences greatly
affects the outcome of any decision regarding the delimitation
and continental shelf right in the Barents Sea. Although
anxious to reach a delimitation agreement with the Soviet
Union, Norway has not reached a final decision with respect
to the continental shelf extending north from Finnmark, all
the way to the northern extent of the shelf in the Svalbard
area. Formally establishing a firm policy before the
negotiations have been concluded at the United Nations Law
of the Sea Conference would result in the adoption of a
policy that would be unfavorable with respect to conference
decisions. Of extreme importance is the agreement by an
Finn Sollie, "New Territories and New Problems in
Norwegian Foreign and Security Policy," Cooperation and
Conflict 2/3, 1974, p. 148.
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international body of definitions for the terms "continental
shelf" and the 'Exclusive Economic Zone."
The continental shelf, for example, could be determined
to be that portion of the shelf of a fixed depth of less than
300 meters. Norway has troughs both in the Norwegian and
North Seas and in the Barents Sea which would be of a greater
depth and result in the loss of area presently claimed. If
a fixed distance (width) were adopted as the method of deter-
mination, 200 nautical miles would be likely, and part of the
present Norwegian claim would be beyond the set criteria.
Ongoing Law of the Sea Conferences have done little to
clear this situation. Presently, the Law of the Sea, the
Geneva Convention of 1958, is the only method of determining
claims, and it has been broken already. Since 1967, attempts
have been made to work out new agreements, but nothing concrete
has resulted. The long sessions at the Caracas Law of the
Sea Conference in 1974 and Geneva Conference in 1975, resulted
in little agreement among participants.
In examining this situation it is clear that either of
the possibilities mentioned would be unacceptable to Norwegian
desires. In either case, the claim to Svalbard's continental
shelf as an extension of the Northern Norwegian continental
shelf would be seriously weakened.
For a more thorough examination of Law of the Sea matters,
several references are recommended: Christopher Bertram and
Johan J0rgen Hoist, eds., New Strategic Factors in the North
Atlantic
. Oslo, Universitetsforlaget , 1977; William E. Butler,
The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea , Baltimore, the John
Hopkins Press, 1971; S. Houston Lay, Robin Churchill and
Myron Nordquist, eds., New Directions in the Law of the Sea
,




From a Soviet viewpoint, the delimitation of the Barents
Sea and the continental shelf could present a threat to
freedom of movement if not to security of the Kola Peninsula.
The importance of the bases on the Kola Peninsula has already
been mentioned, but the importance of the Barents Sea deserves
a more detailed discussion.
The Barents Sea is the Soviet Union's route to the North
Atlantic: the major route for the world's largest concentra-
tion of submarines and the only route for the surface vessels
of the Soviet Northern Fleet. Further restricted by winter
ice, the normal passage during the cold months of the year is
decreased to a width of 215 nautical miles or approximately
the gap between Finnmark and Bear Island.
Clearly, the Soviets are in no hurry to decide the issue
of delimitation. At the present time, they do not need the
oil believed to be beneath the continental shelf. In fact,
they probably do not possess the necessary equipment or
technology necessary to take advantage of the oil in the area.
More important to the Soviet Union is the possibility of oil
companies setting up offshore oil rigs in the Barents Sea
between Finnmark and Bear Island and further limiting the
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access of the Soviet Navy to the Atlantic.
The Soviets fear that foreign countries may use the
offshore rigs as a means of monitoring the location and move-
ment of Soviet naval forces including submarines operating




foreigners in the Finnmark area, and the slim chance that any
foreign firm would be allowed to drill for oil in the area,
the Soviets distrust the Norwegians just as much and would
fear NATO's use of offshore rigs as monitoring stations for
Soviet Naval Forces. Meanwhile, until the rights to the
ocean floor are settled, the Norwegians have prohibited all
drilling activity north of the 62 parallel. Only on Spits-
bergen have test wells been drilled, so far without success.
Both the Norwegians and the Soviets have conducted drilling
tests on Svalbard.
C. SOVIET MILITARY EXERCISES
In 1974, the first talks began between the Soviet Union
and the Norwegians over possible delimitation of the conti-
nental shelf. Within a year, the Soviets were involved in a
new method of gaining the attention of the Norwegians and
NATO. The Soviets decided to test several missiles and the
target they announced was the disputed area in the delimita-
73tion talks
.
On 11 September 1975, the Soviet Union announced the
missile tests which would take place from 16 September until
27 September 1975. The missile tests were the latest in a
series of military demonstrations designed to impress the
Norwegians with Soviet military might.
Beyond this military demonstration lies the possible
political pressure the tests will exert on Norway.
73
"Soviet Missile Tests Set for Barents Sea," New York
Times, 12 September 1975, p. 4.
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The Soviet Union is about to negotiate with Norway
over national boundaries on the continental shelf
in the Barents Sea south of Spitsbergen. 74-
NATO intelligence analysts considered the tests important
for several reasons. The missile tests will provide excellent
information about the type and reliability of missiles sur-
rounding the huge naval base on the Kola Peninsula. These
tests also marked the first time that Soviet missiles were
fired in a major test outside the Pacific area. In addition,
these tests were obviously designed to announce to the world
a new capability for the Soviet Union. The official Soviet
explanation was that the tests were only a method of clearing
silos in Siberia.
The missile tests followed the largest of semi-annual
Soviet Navy exercises in which all four fleets took part in
one giant operation. OKEAN 1975, as the exercise was called,
was obviously planned to demonstrate the Soviet Navy's ability
to operate on a worldwide basis. OKEAN 1975 marked the first
exercise in which convoys of merchantmen were used. In
addition, much more attention was paid to antisubmarine
operations. Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf
noted the "disturbing fact" that the Soviet Navy today,
"has twice the number of major surface combatants and submarines
7
6
as the United States Navy."
74Drew Middleton, "Soviet Testing Missiles in Barents
Sea," New York Times , 17 September 1975, p. 4.
Drew Middleton, "Military Strategy of New Importance in
North Norway Near Soviet," New York Times , 20 June 1977, p. 14.
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"Vast Soviet Naval Exercise Raises Urgent Questions for
West," New York Times , 28 April 1975, p. 6.
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Other Soviet naval exercises have increased in size and
scope in recent years. One of the most significant took
place in April 1977, when the Soviets sent 89 submarines into
the Atlantic at one time. (The Soviets normally keep seven
or eight submarines in the Atlantic.) This submarine exercise
was accompanied by "a large force of surface warships including
the new aircraft carrier Kiev . " This exercise was also
accompanied at times by the newest Soviet supersonic bombers,
"Backfires", which flew over the maneuvers, operating out of
the Murmansk area.
In the most recent exercises the Soviets have also
practiced amphibious landings on the Kola Peninsula, utilizing
troops that are based there. These exercises greatly concern
the Norwegians since most scenarios for a Soviet invasion of
Norway call for a combination land attack and amphibious
assault with airborne assistance.
Perhaps the most disturbing exercise for the Norwegians
took place in June of 1968, when the Norwegian border guards
and border workers woke to find a Soviet division deployed
right next to the border in northern Norway. This display of
force occurred just before the invasion of Czechoslovakia
and is thought to have been connected to it. The totally
unexpected action by the Soviets triggered a change in
Norwegian public opinion which will be discussed in the next
chapter.
"Soviet Sent 89 Subs Into Atlantic," New York Times
,
29 July 1977, p. A4.
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D. THE "GRAY ZONE"
Although no agreement has been reached in the delimita-
tion talks between the Soviet Union and Norway, separate
talks concerning fishing in the Barents Sea finally produced
results in May 1977. A proposal by the Norwegian Law of the
Sea Minister Jens Evensen was accepted by the Soviets and
temporarily solved the fishing limit negotiations. Mr.
Evensen 's proposal consisted of drawing a line around the
78fishing banks without using a sector line or a median line.
On 2 July 1977, the protocol signed by the Norwegians
and Soviets concerning fishing rights was released to the
press. Provisions were made to allow both countries to fish
'in the "gray zone" without interfering with each other. The
protocol was temporary, but provided the break needed to allow
both countries fishing industries to take advantage of the
Barents Sea. The protocol also provided for the licensing
79
of other countries by both the Soviets and the Norwegians.
However, in August 1978, the Soviets turned two British
fishing trawlers away from the "gray zone." Both trawlers
had been licensed by the Norwegians under the agreement of
801977. New talks concerning the "gray zone" were scheduled
78
"Minister Proposes New Fishing Demarkation to Soviets,"
Arbeiderbladet (Oslo) 18 May 1977, p. 2, translated in Foreign
Broadcast Information Service , Western Europe, 24 May 1977, p. PI.
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"Fisheries Agreement Protocol with Soviets Published,"
Aftenposten (Oslo) 2 July 1977, p. 4, translated in Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe , 12 July 1977.
8
"British Trawlers Turned Back by Soviets," Aftenposten
(Oslo) 24 August 1978, p. 4, translated in Foreign Broadcast
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in the near future and this incident appeared to be another
example of muscle flexing by the Soviets.
E. TERRITORIAL WATERS
Other recent actions by the Soviets in the Barents Sea
have the Norwegians concerned and confused, International
law allows the Soviet merchant ships to pass through Norwegian
territorial waters but does not allow them to stop. In the
thirty-three years since the end of World War II, seven
incidents had taken place in violation of this law—until
27 June 1978. Between 27 June and 4 August 1978, eight
violations occurred on the Norwegian northern cape causing
o-i
alarm among the Norwegian people.
Several excuses were given by the Soviets for these
actions. In one case, a tugboat and three smaller vessels
anchored off the Nordhyn Peninsula claiming they were seeking
shelter from bad weather. The Seas were calm at the time and
when gunboats were dispatched, the four boats left.
An oceanographic vessel requested permission to enter
territorial waters complaining of engine problems and a leak.
Norwegian naval personnel went onboard and found no water or
difficulty, but a large amount of electrical equipment. Once
out of territorial waters the boat turned on the speed and
disappeared. Other similar incidents began occurring repeatedly.
O J
Finally one ship's captain was fined before being released.
O-l
R.W. Apple, Jr., "Mysterious Soviet Ship Movements Worry
and Puzzle Norwegians," New York Times , 4 August 1978, p. A2
.
8?
"Nautical Cat and Mouse," Time , 7 August 1978, p. 48.
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All of these incidents add up to some type of surveil-
lance of the Norwegian coastline, but the Norwegians couldn't
understand the sudden increase in an area where such incidents
have never been a problem before. Fishermen who observed one
of the boats described some type of pod device that hung off
the bow into the sea. The vessel was also flying flags




Several theories exist to explain the sudden number of
violations . The Soviets could have been attempting to
improve their eavesdropping capability or repairing what
they already had. Another theory indicated that this series
of incidents could have been aimed at improving the air
defense weakness that allowed the Korean Airliner to penetrate
Soviet airspace for almost 30 minutes before being challenged.
This particular incident took place when a South Korean
passenger airliner crossing the polar cap suddenly made a
wrong turn and violated Soviet airspace in the Murmansk
region. NATO air defense personnel could not understand at
the time what had happened, or why the Soviets were so slow
to respond. The Korean airliner was finally shot at and hit
by Soviet intercepters , forcing it to land on a frozen lake
bed.
In another related note, Norwegian defense chief General
O O
"More Reports, Reaction on USSR Ship Movements,
Violations," Aftenposten (Oslo), 25 July 1978, p. 4, trans-
lated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western
Europe
, 31 July 1978, p. Pl-2.
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Sverre Hamre told the Oslo Aftenposten , "We noticed partic-
ularly that the Soviet Russians have replaced one entire
air force wing with more modern hardware. . .with approxi-
84
mately three times the range of previous planes." He
went on to mention that the change was perhaps an increase




"Soviet Union Replacing Air Forces on Kola," Aftenposten
(Oslo), 25 July 1978, p. 4, translated in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, Western Europe , 15 June 1978, p. P-2
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V. NORWEGIAN PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL REACTION
The previous discussion has provided the background of
Norwegian Nordic ties and the history of increasing Soviet
pressure on Norway. In order to show their effect on Nor-
wegian public opinion and politics, three areas will be dis-
cussed. The EEC referendum of 1972 has often been misinter-
preted as an indication that Norway is withdrawing from
European alliances. Therefore, this referendum is discussed
in detail to clearly indicate that the results were not
related to public support of NATO. The national election of
1973 is discussed relating its results to the EEC referendum
and not to NATO. Finally, the results of polls indicating
support for NATO are provided to demonstrate Norway's increasing
public support which should not be linked to other issues.
A. THE EEC REFERENDUM OF 1972
The Norwegian constitution does not provide for public
referendums on controversial issues, but occassionally such
issues are handled by public referendum. The EEC debate was
one such issue.
Norway's entry into the Common Market had been debated
since 1962, increasing each year and finally dominating
Norwegian politics in 1972, just prior to the referendum.
Norwegians were not voting on whether or not to remain
isolated from the European Economic Community, since few




"no" vote to membership in the Common Market.
The individual issues debated throughout the country
fell into major categories, which were of changing impor-
tance during the period 1967-72. These categories were:
1. The international considerations of the EEC, particularly
those arguments pertaining to the need for world
cooperation.
2. The internal structure of the EEC and the possibilities
of it becoming a political union, also questions concerning
its governing body.
3. The effect of membership on Norwegian foreign policy and
possible influence Norway would have in the decisions of
the EEC.
4. The effect on Norwegian internal policies relating to
Socialism or social and welfare policies.
5. The possibility of EEC membership reducing Norwegian
sovereignty.
6. The degree to which the Norwegian national economy,
particularly individual sectors such as fishing and
agriculture, could be changed by EEC membership.
7. The effect on Norwegian cultural characteristics from a
closer relationship with other, predominantly Catholic,
European nations.
8. The question of legality of joining the EEC under the
present Norwegian constitution.
8 5
In May 1973, a free-trade agreement was subsequently




9. The thoroughness of the government study of the entire
EEC membership issue.
The entire question was complicated by the problems of
party affiliation, occupation, region, age and urban environ-
ment. The issue cut so strongly through party lines that
the parties remained fragmented until after the next national
election in 1973. The polls indicated that after January,
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Figure 1. Intend to Vote No, Percentage of Those Who Took a Position.
Sources: FAKTA's and Gallup's polls for the period September 1971 -December 1972. The
question asked has not been identical over the whole period, but has always referred to a
dichotomous choice between yes and no to full membership. The size of the 'uncertain'
category (including refusals, those who do not intend to vote, and those who have not yet
made up their mind) has varied considerably, partly due to slight changes in interviewing
technique. For FAKTA the percentages of uncertain respondents were: 41, 41, 39, 39, 34,
37, 34, 36, 17, 20, 15, 15. 13, 14. For Gallup: 27, 24, 27, 28, 21, 23, 27, 27, 24, 19, 21, 21,
12, 8, 5, 8. The January 1972 Gallup result may have been influenced by a biased (pro-EFC)
question preceding it in the interview schedule. The April 1972 FAKTA figure is the arithmetic
mean of two questions biased in opposite directions.
Figure 10
Source: Scandinavian Political Studies , vol, 8/73, (Oslo
Universitetsforlaget, 1973), p~. 227
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Figure 10, however, does not reflect the percentage of
those who took no position. The government believed that
membership would be accepted by a slight margin.
The results of the referendum showed 46.5% voting "Yes"
and 53.5% voting "No." The polls were obviously quite
accurate; voter turnout for the referendum was light by
Norwegian standards, 79.3%, compared with 83.8% in the 1969
national election. The results indicate that those with no
opinion in the polls reflected their position by not voting.
In order to show voting preferences in relation to other
categories a number of tables are presented.
Table 1. Percentage of Votes Cast in Favor of Full EEC Membership by Region
Oslofjord Interior South and Middle
area East West (Tr0ndelag)
North
59.4 44.6 41.8 38.9 28.3
Source: Public electoral statistics of the 1972 referendum.
Table 1
Source: Henry Valen, "Norway: 'No' to EEC." Scandinavian
Political Studies , vol. 8/73, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget
,
1973), p. 216.
The heaviest opposition came from sparsely populated
fishing and agricultural communities along the coast. The
largest "Yes" vote was from urbanized communities as indicated
in Tables 1 and 2.
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Oiff. (1 - 2) 12.9 22.3- 15.0
* At least half of the population living in agglomerations.
Source: Public electoral statistics 1972.
Table 2
Source: Valen, p. 216
Table lit. EEC Vote and Occupation





















* Non-voters (8 percent of the sample) arc excluded.
Table 3
Source: Valen, p. 217.
Tables 3-7 were constructed utilizing polls, figures in
parenthesis indicate the number of voters questioned. The
rural occupations along the coast are clearly reflected as
the heavies opposition to EEC membership, as reflected in
Table 3. Although the majority of manual laborers opposed
membership, their "Yes" vote was significantly higher and
placed them directly between the business men and rural
voters. Similarly in Table 4, the rural community providing
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products or those supporting the position of the farmers and
fishermen, were more likely to oppose membership than those
who disagreed with the statement, "To secure equality between
different branches of the economy, farmers and fishermen
o /:
ought to get far higher prices for their products."
Tabic IV. EEC Vote and Urban-Rural Position ('Prices ought to be higher'). (Percentage























Source: Valen, p. 218.
Table V. EEC Vote and Left-Right Position (Percentage voting 'yes.' Non-voters excluded)
Left Right












Source: Valen, p. 218.
When asked questions determining liberal -conservative
political attitudes and placed on a scale of 1-6, the voters
comparative EEC stance is not as varied as expected. The
Of:
Henry Valen, "Norway: 'No' to EEC," Scandinavian





placement, however, was defined more in terms of government
control of business than in support of political party.
Tabic VI. EEC Vote and Background in Cultural Movements (Percentage voting 'yes.' Non-




































Source: Valen, p. 219.
*
Table 6 reflects EEC voting in comparison with cultural
movements. The table reflects that membership in cultural
movements tends to increase the likelihood of opposition to
EEC membership. The religious movement members do not show
as strong a relationship, but 10% difference in voting pref-
erence is still significant.
Norwegian society is strictly divided on policies con-
cerning alcohol. Penalties for breaking laws concerning
alcohol (example: driving while intoxicated) are severe,
and the relationship shown here reflects not only personal
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drinking habits, but attitudes towards alcohol policies
(i.e. active/inactive). Strict non-drinkers were decidedly
opposed to EEC membership, while active drinkers were twice
as likely to vote in favor.
The language preference concerns the use of the more
colloquial nynorsk as opposed to the literary riksmal . Again,
the rural -urban differences show since nynorsk is more popular
in the rural and coastal areas, the relationship between
nynorsk and EEC opposition is not surprising.
The relationship of EEC support to political party requires
explanation of the parties. Important to remember is the fact
that the parties were not particularly active in the referen-
dum since national and local elections were not involved.
This lack of involvement perhaps allowed for the change of
attitudes of many party members following the referendum.
Parties existing during the EEC debate included:
1. Labor (A)—moderate since the 1920' s, advocating gradual
reforms leading to a socialist state; formed all govern-
ments between 1935 and 1965 except for a brief period
in 1963.
2. Conservative (H)— supports free enterprise and close ties
with the west.
3. Liberal (V)—against socialism but supporting the welfare
state through gradual reforms
.
4. Christian People's (KrF)— supports Christian principles
and social legislation; supports NATO.
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5. Center (S)— formerly Agrarian party, represents rural
interests; strongly supports NATO.
6. Socialist People's (SF) —neutralist, formed after expulsion
from Labor party as an extreme leftist group in 1961;
oppose NATO and advocate nonalignment
.
7. Norwegian Communist (NKP)— ideology along party line
from Moscow; unable to gain any popular support
Party preference is indicated in Table 7, with the parties
arranged from left to right as they are considered in the
political spectrum. The relationship of support for EEC
membership to party preference does not fall in line with
party expectations. The factor of deviation has been deter-
mined as 18% of party members who deviated from their party's
position, i.e. felt that another party's view came closer to
their personal preference in the referendum.
Table VII. EEC Vote and Party Preference.* (Percentage voting 'vex.' Non-voters excluded.































* Question on party preference: 'Let us assume elections should be arranged tomorrow. Which
party would you vote for?'
Table 7
Source: Valen, p. 221.
Other factors are involved in the government's failure
to predict the outcome of the referendum: 1 ) In polls of
Parliament members, 75% supported membership, accurately
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reflecting the urban, business vote, but not necessarily
their regions. 2) A clearly defined choice in an election
with important consequences, usually produces a very high
voter turnout. In the EEC referendum, the urban area voter
turnout percentage was only 3.2% better than rural areas
compared with a normal gap of 9.5%. 3) Interest in the out-
come of the referendum appeared to be higher in the rural
areas
.
Finally, in post-referendum polls, the majority in all
polls favored entry. Excluding the undecided, the results
in October 1972 were 55/45 in favor and by June 1973 were
8757/43. As a result of the referendum, the Premier and his
Cabinet announced they would resign and did on 6 October 1972.
As previously mentioned, the confusion in political party
affiliation lasted until the following national election.
B. THE NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1973
The election of 1973 provided very interesting results
and the formation of two new parties as well as a new alliance
1. New People's (DNF)— the Liberal split over the referendum
results, with the pro-EEC members forming a new party and
claiming the true Liberal ( Venstre ) tradition.
2. Ander Lange's (ALP)— voters frustrated by the government's
inability to reduce taxes supported an old nationalist
conservative who founded his own party against taxes,






3. The 'No' front from the liberal party broke off, formed
a movement, the Worker's Information Committee (AIK),
then merged with the Socialist People's (SF) and the
Communist (NKP), forming the Socialist Electoral
Alliance (SV); the first time a united left front had
been formed in Norwegian politics.
Votes and Scats in the Storting Elections of 1969 and 1973
Party Votes Seats
In Percent of All Cast
1969 1973 1969 1973 DirT. 1969 1973 Diff.
1Marxists- Leninists 0.43 +0.43 _
CP 1.04 -
SF 3.50 -
SV - 11.23 (+ 6.69) 16 (+16)
LAB 46.53 35.29 - 11.24 74 62 - 12
V 9.38 (6.92) (- 2.46) 13 (3) (- 10)
V - 3.49 2
DNF - 3.43 1
CHR 9.40 12.24 + 2.84 14 20 + 6
AGR 10.53 11.03 + 0.50 20 21 + 1
CONS 19.57 17.38 - 2.19 29 29
ALP - 5.01 + 5.01 - 4 + 4
Other 0.05 0.47 + 0.42
Total Votes 2,162,596 2,152,204
Turnout 83.8% 80.2%
Seats 150 155 + 5
Note: All votes for joint lists have been distributed among the parties in proportion to earlier
results on separate lists.
Table 8
Source: Henry Valen and Stein Rokkan, "Norway: The Election
to the Storting in September 1973," Scandinavian Political
Studies
,
vol. 9/74, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget , 1974), p. 207.
As a result of the election, the New People's Party won
1 seat, Anders Lange ' s Party (originally considered a joke)
won 4 seats and the new alliance, the Socialist Electoral
Alliance, won 16 seats. The major losses occurred in the
Liberal Party which lost 11 seats (the DNF, split from the
78

Liberal, won only a single seat) and in the Labor Party,
which lost 12 seats. Although the Labor Party suffered a
major setback, together with the Socialist Electoral
Alliance, it was able to gain a one seat majority in the
Parliament and form a minority government.
SHIFTS IN PARTY SUPPORT, 1963-73, BY STAND ON EEC AT THE REFERENDUM
(in percentages of respondents)
1973
New Conser- Anders
Left- Labor Liberal People's Christian Center vative Lange's
1969 socialists party party party party party party party Total N
1972 EEC Supporters
Left-socialists (9)«
Labor 3 92 b 1 b 2 2 100 .(238)
Liberal 4 17 4 48 2 2 21 2 100 (48)
Christian 6 6 69 19 100 (16)
Center (13)«
Conservative 2 4 2 2 1 82 7 100 (114)
1972 EEC Opponents
Left-socialists 96 4 100 (26)
Labor 25 59 1 9 3 1 2 100 (193)
Liberal 3 5 40 5 15 22 8 2 100 (40)
Christian 3 90 7 100 (60)
Center 1 1 8 88 1 1 100 (128)
Conservative 7 4 4 2 4 32 39 7 100 (44)
• Too few cases for computation of percentages.
* Less than .05 percent.
Source: See footnote 4.
Table 9
Source: Karl H. Cerny, ed. , Scandinavia at the Polls ,
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1977), p. 65.
Three major issues dominated the 1973 election:
1) taxation, 2) abortion and 3) the continuing question of
Norway's relationship to the EEC. The taxation question
allowed Anders Lange's Party to win 4 seats, but created
minor losses in other parties. The abortion issue was a
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moral -religious issue calling for the right to self-determined
abortion. The opponents of this issue tended to be opponents
of EEC membership from the rural community, resulting in
losses to the Labor Party. The EEC issue created the major
changes, since opponents of EEC tended to change parties,
creating the major losses in the Labor and Liberal Parties
and gains in the new alliance, and in the Christian and
center parties. Table 9 indicates the shift in party support
of EEC supporters and opponents.
The changes which occurred in the election of 1973 were
interpreted by many as another example of the growing European
shift towards the new Socialism (or even Eurocommunism). In
the case of Norway, this simply was not true. In the 1977
national election, the Labor Party gained 14. seats, 2 more
than it had lost in 1973; the Conservative Party gained 13
seats (remained the same in 1973) and the Christian People's
Party gained 2 (gained 6 in 1973). The Center Party, which
had gained 2 seats in 1973, lost 9 seats; the Socialist
Electoral Alliance lost 15 of the 16 seats it had won in 1973;
and the New People's Party and Anders Lange Party disappeared.
The Labor Party again formed a minority government (with the
coalition of the 2 Liberal Party seats they again controlled
the Parliament by 1 seat). It is therefore possible to point
out that, with the disappearance of the EEC issue, the




The results of the EEC referendum and the 1973 national
election results were interpreted by many as indicating a
change of national interests in Norway. Consequently, the
question of continued support for NATO arose. The concern
was unnecessary.
Polls conducted since Norway's entry into NATO have not
always shown the strongest of support. In June 1949 public
opinion polls indicated that 54% of Norwegians felt that
membership in NATO increased Norway's security, with that
segment of the population believing Norway's security to be
decreased in the alliance, numbering 17%. A slightly dif-
ferent poll has been taken annually since 1965. In 1967,
49% thought NATO membership contributed to Norwegian
security, while those who saw it as increasing the danger
of attack numbered 12%, a peak in this poll. The mean
figures between 1965 and 1973 were 58% and 9% respectively.
By the end of 1972, the number supporting NATO membership
had risen to 64%, 17% thought it made no difference, 13%
didn't know, and only 6% saw membership in NATO as increasing
the danger of attack.
This change in poll figures can be explained by actions
in the world and in Europe which affected Norway either
directly or indirectly. The involvement of the United
States in Viet Nam was unpopular in Norway in the mid-1960* s,
just as it was in other parts of Europe and in the United
States. This and a general drift toward relaxed military
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readiness in Norway is reflected in the public opinion polls
of 1967.
The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, together with
actions on the Norwegian-Soviet border contributed greatly
to the growth of Norwegian wariness towards their neighbor.
The Norwegians realize that the major objective of the
Russian buildup is connected with its global strategy
rather than being directed specifically against Norway,
but they received a salutary shock during the Czecho-
slovakian crisis in 1968 when Soviet tanks took up
positions within yards of the Norwegian border.""
Perhaps this feeling is better reflected in a poll taken
by the Institute of Social Research in Norway. The Institute
asks whether Norway should remain a member of NATO. Elimin-
ating those with no opinion, the 1965 poll showed 76% in
favor of remaining and 24% for withdrawing. The figures
for 1969 and 1972 were 81%/19% and 85%/15% respectively.
The latest polls have found support percentage figures
reaching the 90* s. Norwegian Vice Admiral Oddmund P. Ahenes
recently stated, "Public polls show that the Norwegian people
look more favorably on defense and defense spending than they
have in a very long time. There is great support for the
89government's defense policy."
In direct comparison with the issues of the EEC referen-
dum and the 1973 election, Norwegian support for NATO never
wavered. One area of Norway which registered the strongest
opposition to EEC membership, the coastal area, shows strong
oo
"Norway. The Next Richest Nation," p. 23.
89,, . Q0Prina, p. 32.
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support for NATO membership. In the political arena, the
Conservative Party provides the strongest support for NATO,
and in the 1977 national election, won 12 new seats for a
total of 41; this was the same election that saw the strongest
anti-NATO parties lose every seat but two (a loss of 14).
The Labor Party regained its previous seats, but still did not
gain a majority, and a coalition government was necessary.
The results show a shift away from the left, where gains in
1973 reflected national issues other than NATO support.
Paxty
Party Representation in the Storting
1969 1973 1977
Labor 74 62 76
Socialist Left 16 2
Conservative 29 29 41
Center 20 21 12
Christian People's 14 20 22
Anders Langc 4
(Progressives in 1977)




The question of Norwegian support for NATO is clearly a
separate issue in national polls and elections, decided on
its own merits and not tied to other national issues. No
evidence exists that Norwegian support for NATO has declined,
is declining or will show any decline in the future, particu-




An examination of Norway's position in the "Nordic
Balance" has determined that all the reasons for Norway's
initial entry into the alliance are still valid. The Nor-
wegian experience of the Nazi occupation during World War II
has instilled in the people of Norway a fierce determination
never again to be occupied or dominated. As the neighbor of
a powerful and, in recent years, aggressive nation founded on
an opposing ideology, the Norwegians fully realize they are
unable to defend their position without the assistance of
strong, determined allies. An alliance of Nordic neighbors
could not be satisfactorily organized, nor could it provide
the necessary defense capability.- Realizing the need for
stronger Western allies, Norway entered the NATO alliance
with qualifications in the form of policies designed to
protect herself and her Nordic neighbors.
The "base policy" prevents foreign troops or nuclear
arms from being stationed on Norwegian soil. This policy
helps insure the independence of Finland from Soviet occu-
pation and provides for the continued armed neutrality of
Sweden. This "Nordic Balance" is a method for the Scandin-
avian countries to hold the Soviet Union from active aggression.
In fact, the "base policy" allows Norway the opportunity for
immediate political action in the event of Soviet aggression.
For the same reason Norway prevents allied troops from
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maneuvering, overflying or landing military ships east of the
24° line in northern Norway. To provide support for her allies,
Norway annually trains NATO forces in Arctic warfare as well
as amphibious landings on the jagged Norwegian coastline.
The close cooperation between Norway and the other Nordic
nations should not be misunderstood. Norway's cultural and
historical ties to the rest of Scandinavia allow Scandinavia
to be the most integrated region of independent states in the
world. Norway takes part in this "Nordic Unity" with the same
cooperation and enthusiasm that is shown toward all international
organizations promoting cooperation and peace on the earth.
In the post World War II era and, in particular, the last
ten years, the Soviet Union has begun to exhibit more aggres-
sion towards Norway. As Anders C. Sjaastad, research associate
of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs stated:
"The Soviets have changed their stance; from a defensive to
90
an offensive posture." Although the major attention of
NATO is directed to the central front of western Europe,
increasing Soviet actions, centered around their naval build-
up in the Kola Peninsula, have begun to attract greater
attention. The (former) Supreme Allied Commander, Europe,
General Alexander M. Haig warns, "If you look at the current
situation of strategic parity, it is evident that we are
not going to be faced in the short term with a major onslaught
across the eastern frontiers. We are going to be plagued by
91those ambiguous situations on the flanks." This perception
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emphasizes the Norwegian precarious position.
Perhaps the Soviets misinterpreted the recent political
scene in Norway that has also been misunderstood by many
Westerners. The results of the EEC referendum could have
been seen as a refusal of further western alliances, rather
than the strong nationalist reaction of rural and liberal
groups who wanted self-determination in Norway's economic
future. In addition, a misinterpretation of the 1973
national election results could have indicated a shift towards
socialism (or Eurocommunism). However, close examination of
the Norwegian political scene and in particular, the results
of the 1977 national election, indicate that the 1972-73
political scene simply reflected a temporary dissatisfaction
with individual political parties.
In the past ten years, the Soviets have maintained a
constant stream of events, all designed to test Norway's
determination and will. The continual challenging of Nor-
wegian sovereignty on Svalbard, the military exercises growing
in size and scope, the repetitive violation of Norwegian air
space and four mile territorial waters, the refusal to nego-
tiate a settlement on issues involving the continental shelf
and the neverending protests over NATO participation, all
clearly indicate a desire to test the resolve of the
Norwegian people. By failing to understand Norwegian resolve,
Soviet actions have been counterproductive, angering Norwegian
citizens and resulting in a marked increase in national
determination and an equal increase in dislike and distrust
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of the Soviets. This national feeling has triggered new and
stronger support for defense policies and spending as well
as NATO membership.
A review of Norwegian national polls indicates continuing
strong public support for NATO. Since the Soviet border
demonstration in 1968, the Norwegian people have steadily
increased support for NATO and for strong defense programs.
Soviet activities on Svalbard, in the Barents Sea and on the
Norwegian coast, have resulted in increased public awareness
of the Soviet threat, and public support allows the Norwegian
government to make use of a strong link with NATO as a signal
to the Soviets of Norwegian independence
.
Clearly, the increased Soviet pressure on Norway has been
counterproductive. Norwegians have viewed Soviet actions
toward Norway as a threat to Norway's security. The result
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